Random perturbation is a promising technique for privacy preserving data mining. It retains an original sensitive value with a certain probability and replaces it with a random value from the domain with the remaining probability. If the replacing value is chosen from a large domain, the retention probability must be small to protect privacy. For this reason, previous randomizationbased approaches have poor utility. In this paper, we propose an alternative way to randomize sensitive values, called small domain randomization. First, we partition the given table into sub-tables that have smaller domains of sensitive values. Then, we randomize the sensitive values within each sub-table independently. Since each sub-table has a smaller domain, a larger retention probability is permitted. We propose this approach as an alternative to classical partition-based approaches to privacy preserving data publishing. There are two key issues: ensure the published sub-tables do not disclose more private information than what is permitted on the original table, and partition the table so that utility is maximized. We present an effective solution.
INTRODUCTION
The objective of privacy preserving data mining (PPDM) is to discover interesting patterns in a given dataset T, without deriving any sensitive information. To achieve this goal, input perturbation [3] [4] [8] [9] [12] [14] [17] [21] converts T to another dataset T* that permits effective PPDM, and at the same time, protects the sensitive information in T. Random perturbation [3] [4] [8] [9] is a promising input perturbation method, due to strong privacy guarantees. We focus on a specific, widely adopted, random perturbation technique, called Uniform Perturbation [3] .
Consider a sensitive attribute SA in T. For a given retention probability p, Uniform Perturbation retains the sensitive value x  SA in a record with probability p and replaces x with a random value chosen from the domain of SA with probability (1  p). The value of p represents the tradeoff between the utility of the perturbed T* and the strength of privacy protection; when p = 1, all sensitive values are revealed (no privacy) and when p = 0, all sensitive values are completely randomized (no utility).
Notoriously Low Retention
Random perturbation was initially used for collecting sensitive binary survey results [22] and later extended to a categorical attribute with an arbitrary domain size [3] . As the domain size increases, the retention probability p diminishes in order to protect privacy. Consider a sensitive attribute SA with the domain size m. The probability that the original value x is replaced with a specific value y chosen from the entire domain of SA is q = (1  p)/m, where (1  p) is the probability that x will be replaced by any value from the domain of SA. To hide x, the total probability (p + q) that x remains unchanged should not be "much larger" than the replacing probability q, i.e., the ratio  = (p + q) / q should be a "small" value. Solving these equations, we get q = 1/(m -1 + ) and p = (  1)/ (m  1 + ).
In practice, these probabilities can be too small due to a large m. Consider the 8 discrete attributes of the CENSUS dataset (see Appendix 10.8 for details). Assuming ratio  = 5, Table 1 shows the domain size m and the probabilities p and q for each attribute. Unless the domain size m is very small (< 10), the retention probability p is very low (< 30%), rendering the perturbed T* too noisy for data mining. The above situation can get much worse in some practical scenarios. The standardized medical diagnoses ICD-9 codes (http://icd9cm.chrisendres.com) consist of over m = 15,000 different values. With  = 5, q = 6.710 -5 and (p + q) = 3.310 -4 . In the case of multiple sensitive attributes, previous studies [4] [24] suggest considering the "compound attribute" SA with a domain equal to the cross-product of sensitive attributes. For example, the compound attribute for Age and Country has domain size m = 77  70 = 5390. With  = 5, q = 1.910 -4 , (p + q) = 7.410 -4 . In both cases, the uncertainty created by such a low retention probability is far more than what is required for privacy and the perturbed data is nearly completely random and useless.
The above analysis shows that low retention probability is caused by randomization over the entire domain of SA. To address this problem, the first thought is partitioning the domain of SA into disjoint subsets dom 1 ,…,dom k and perturbing the records T i for dom i independently. However, this approach is dangerous if T i has a more skewed distribution of sensitive values. Suppose H1N1, SARS, HIV, and cancer occurs in 40%, 30%, 29%, and 1% of records in T, respectively. After partitioning the domain into dom 1 = {H1N1, cancer} and dom 2 = {SARS, HIV}, H1N1 occurs in 98% of records in T 1 , compared to only 40% in T. The increased dominance of H1N1 in T 1 leads to a similar increase in the perturbed data, which poses a larger threat to the records in T 1 . The other partitioning has a similar problem. Thus, the approach of simply partitioning the domain of SA is not a solution.
Contributions
Instead of partitioning the domain of SA, the key to our approach is to partition the table T into disjoint sub-tables T 1 ,...,T k and perturb each T i independently within SA i , where SA i denotes the subset of SA that occur in T i . Since T 1 ,...,T k is a partitioning of T, SA i is allowed to overlap. With a reduced domain SA i , both the retention probability (p + q) and the replacing probability q for T i will increase (more utility), whereas the ratio (p + q)/q will remain unchanged (same privacy). We refer to this approach as Small Domain Randomization. Our contributions are as follows.
Privacy
We ensure that the adversary learns no more sensitive information from the perturbed sub-tables T 1 *,...,T k *, than what is permitted by the privacy requirement on T. We consider a restricted form of ( 1 ,  2 )-privacy [9] and we derive a new privacy requirement for each T i such that enforcing the new privacy on T i is sufficient for enforcing the given privacy requirement on T.
Utility We ensure partitioning {T 1 ,...,T k } minimizes the error of reconstructing SA's probability distribution in T. The challenge is that T 1 *,...,T k * is a random instance and minimizing error for such a specific instance makes little sense. We derive a probabilistic error bound that holds with a given probability over all instances and search for a partitioning {T 1 ,...,T k } that minimizes this bound.
Algorithm Finding {T 1 ,...,T k } described above is a clustering problem with a global error metric under a privacy constraint. Such problems are unlikely to have an efficient optimal solution. We present a practical and efficient solution by employing several non-trivial techniques, namely, distribution-aware partitioning, band matrix technique, and dynamic programming.
Results
We demonstrate that our algorithm's perturbed data can be used to answer count queries more accurately than traditional randomization and partition-based approaches. Such queries concern a subset of records satisfying a condition on some nonsensitive and sensitive attributes and are crucial for data analysis.
In the rest of this paper, Section 2 reviews related work, Section 3 provides background knowledge, Section 4 defines the problem, Section 5 describes our algorithm, Section 6 presents the experimental evaluation, and we conclude the paper in Section 7.
RELATED WORK
We study input perturbation, where publishing data is essential, as in most data mining applications, and perturbation is applied to the data to protect privacy. In contrast, output perturbation perturbs and publishes the answer to a query, where the data is not published. An example of output perturbation is query answering under differential privacy [16] . Input perturbation can be divided into two categories: partition-based and randomization-based.
Partitioned-based approaches partition the set of records into anonymity groups and release only some information about groups. These approaches include generalization [19] [20] , anatomy [13] [23], and condensation [1] . Since the partitioning is deterministic and binds individuals to small anonymity groups, it is vulnerable to attacks when the adversary possesses additional background knowledge [5] [14] [21] on group members. The corruption attack [21] is an example.
Randomization-based approaches have been used in collecting survey results [22] , in privacy preserving data mining [3] [8] [9] , and more recently in privacy preserving data publishing [17] [21] [24] . Either random noise is added to numeric values [2] , or categorical values are randomly replaced with other values in the domain [3] [8] [9] [12] . Randomization-based approaches are less vulnerable to attacks like corruption attacks because each record is randomized independently and the non-determinism makes it more difficult to corrupt individuals with deterministic background knowledge.
Initial steps have been taken to find optimal randomization schemes for improving data utility [4] [12] [17] . However, all previous works perform randomization over the entire domain of the sensitive attribute, which leads to a low retention probability, as discussed in Section 1.1. To our knowledge, our work is the first to improve utility through randomization in small domains.
PRELIMINARY
The dataset T consists of one sensitive attribute SA and several non-sensitive attributes; multiple sensitive attributes can be treated as one compound sensitive attribute with a domain defined by the cross-product of all sensitive attributes. We assume that SA has the domain {x 1 [24] , each SA-value x i is chosen independently at random according to some fixed probability distribution denoted by p X . The publisher allows the researcher to learn p X , but wants to hide the SA-value of an individual record. [4] . In this perturbation scheme, SA-value x in record r  T is processed by tossing a coin with head probability p, called retention probability. If the coin lands on heads, x is retained in perturbed record r*; otherwise, x is replaced with a random value in SA in r*. Non-sensitive values are unchanged and T* contains all perturbed records r*, |T*| = |T|. Let X and Y be random variables denoting the original and perturbed values, respectively. Both X and Y have domain SA. The probability of perturbing value x  SA to y  SA is given by:
Uniform Perturbation
Recall m is the domain size of SA. In the case of x = y, p + (1-p)/m is the sum of the probability that x is retained and the probability that x is replaced with a specific value y from SA, where y happens to be equal to x. We refer to the set {Pr[x  y] | x, y  SA} as the perturbation operator, or matrix. 
Privacy
The next theorem shows that, for a "suitably small"  value, the condition in (2) ensures ( 1 ,  2 )-privacy.
Theorem 1 [9] Assume that for every y  SA, there exists x j  SA such that Pr[x j  y] > 0. Suppose that the -amplification condition holds and 
With Equation (4), we rewrite the matrix defined in Equation ( From the above derivation, the matrix P in Equation (5) with the  value in Equation (6) ensures ( 1 ,  2 )-privacy. This P looks the same as the gamma-diagonal matrix in [4] , which was shown to maximize the retention probability [4] . However, there is one important difference: the randomization in [4] is over the domain defined by the cross-product of all attributes, whereas the randomization defined by Equation (5) is over the domain of SA. Thus, the domain size m for the gamma-diagonal matrix is much larger the domain size m in Equation (5), which means that the retention probability in [4] is much smaller.
Restricted ( 1 ,  2 )-privacy used in this paper
We consider the restricted form of ( 1 ,  2 )-privacy in which the predicate Q(X) has the form X = x and x is a specific SA-value. Specifically, we want to ensure
This restricted version assumes the adversary's goal is to infer an individual SA-value x, and the publisher wants to limit the posterior probability of such inferences. Note, the L-diversity principle [15] also aims to limit the inference of an individual SAvalue. We will show that, under this restricted privacy notion, small domain randomization will provide the same level of privacy as the table-wise randomization approach. In the rest of the paper, the term ( 1 ,  2 )-privacy refers to this restricted form.
In the absence of further knowledge, X with distribution p X (x) is the best description of the adversary's prior knowledge. Therefore, we model the prior Pr[X = x] by p X (x), i.e., the relative frequency of x in T.
Reconstruction Model
We evaluate the utility of perturbed data T* for reconstructing the SA probability distribution p X (x) and for answering count queries. Let F = <f 1 ,…,f m > denote the frequencies of SA-values x 1 ,...,x m in T. Let F* = <f 1 *,…,f m *> denote the estimate of F reconstructed using T* and P. The reconstruction error of f i * is defined by |f if i *| / |f i |, i=1,…,m. We can estimate F* from T* and P as follows (see more details in Appendix 10.2). Let o = <o 1 ,…,o m > be the observed frequencies from a specific published instance of T*.
Let {A 1 , …, A d } be a subset of all non-sensitive attributes, a j be a value from the domain of A j , j = 1,...,d, and x i be a SA-value.
A count query has the form In other words, each query counts the size of one group defined by a GROUP-BY query with {A 1 ,…,A d , SA} being the GROUP-BY list. To compute the estimate est of the query result, we consider the set of records, Res, from T* satisfying the condition A 1 = a 1 AND … AND A d = a d as a sample of T* and apply the above reconstruction to Res. Specifically, we instantiate o i with the frequency of x i in Res and replace |T*| with |Res| in Equation (7). The estimated frequency f i * of x i in the query condition is returned as the query answer. We can treat Res as a sample of T* because the randomization on SA is entirely independent of the non-sensitive attributes A 1 , …, A d ; therefore, the randomization for Res follows exactly the same probability distribution as for T.
THE PROBLEM STATEMENT
As illustrated in Section 1.1, the retention probability for Uniform Perturbation in Equation (5) diminishes as the domain size m of SA increases. To boost the retention probability, we propose to partition the input T into disjoint sub-tables T 1 ,…,T k such that each T i involves a small sub-domain SA i of SA with the size m i , and perturb each T i independently with perturbation matrix P i over SA i (more details later). Since SA i has a smaller size m, P i has a larger retention probability. The researcher can reconstruct the probability distribution p X (x) for T by computing an estimate est j from T j * and P j , as described in Section 3.3, for each j=1,…,k. The estimate on T is the sum ∑ j est j .
What properties must the partitioning T 1 ,…,T k satisfy?
Assuming a ( 1 ,  2 )-privacy requirement is specified on T by the publisher, two issues arise. First, a skewed SA distribution in a sub-table T i may expose the records in T i to a greater privacy risk than permitted by the given privacy requirement on T (see Section 1.1). Second, the reconstruction error defined in Section 3.3 is for a given instance of the perturbed data, but the perturbed instance actually published is randomly determined, thus, is unknown prior to randomization. Therefore, our partitioning problem must answer two questions: 
Privacy Requirement
Recall that the (restricted) . Among all such  1i , we prefer the smallest one in order to maximize  i (Equation (6)), thus, maximize retention probability p i (Equation (4)). This smallest  1i is determined as follows. Let 
Therefore, given the partitioning T 1 ,…,T k and  1i defined in Equation (9) , our privacy goal is to ensure ( 1i ,  2 )-privacy on T i , i=1,…,k. To this end, we perturb T i using the m i  m i matrix perturbation matrix P i defined in Equation (5) (5) and (6) . For T 1 , m 1 = 6 and 
Utility Requirement
The utility metrics in Section 3.3 are difficult to incorporate into the search for an optimal partitioning because we do not know the count queries in advance. Even for reconstructing the probability distribution p X (x), the reconstruction error defined in Section 3.3 is for a specific instance of T 1 *,…,T k *; minimizing this error is not meaningful because the published instance is randomly generated by our perturbation matrix. It makes more sense to minimize a probabilistic error bound that holds with a certain probability over all possible random instances generated by the perturbation matrix. We now develop this metric.
We first consider T and then the partitioning T 1 ,…,T k . Let Y i be a random variable representing the event that record r i in T has perturbed SA-value y after perturbation, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where n = |T|. Let Y = Y 1 + … + Y n be the frequency of y in T*. The mean of Y,
. According to Chernoff bound [6] , the probability that the error of Y is larger than a fraction  of  is ≤ 2exp(- 2 /4), i.e., Pr[|Y  | > ] < 2 exp(-/4) [3] . This error bound is for the observed frequency on the perturbed T*; however, we are interested in an error bound for the reconstructed frequency on the original data T. Theorem 2 gives such a bound.
Theorem 2 Consider the data T and the perturbed T* produced by applying Uniform Perturbation in Equation (1) on T, with retention probability p. Let f be the frequency of a SA-value x in T and f* be the estimate of f using T*. For a allowable error  and confidence level (1   ), The tightest bound  is obtained by taking the equality in the ifcondition. Substituting p in Equation (4) into this equality, we get:
where a = 2  (log(2 / )) ½ . Now consider a partitioning Part = {T 1 ,...,T k } of T. Let m i and  i on T i be the counterparts of m and  on T defined in Section 3. Adapting Equation (11) to T i , we get the error bounds for T i and the partitioning Part = {T 1 ,…,T k }:
(Part) is a probabilistic error bound, in that, minimizing this bound will minimize the error on a randomly generated instance with confidence level (1  ). The equation for  i reveals two interesting points: first, the  i is expressed explicitly in terms of |T i |, m i and  i , which are easily computed from T i ; second,  i linearly decreases as m i decreases and  i increases, but decreases much slower as |T i | increases. We will exploit this relationship to find a good partitioning in Section 5.
The Problem
Definition 2 (Small Domain Randomization) Given a dataset T, a ( 1 ,  2 )-privacy requirement on T, and confidence level (1   ), find a partitioning {T 1 ,…,T k } of T, such that (i) for i = 1,…,k,  1i <  2 , where  1i is defined by Equation (9), and (ii) ({T 1 ,…,T k }) defined by Equation (12) We note that for reconstruction purposes, SA i and P i will be made public. With such information, the adversary can infer Pr[X = x 1 … X = x k | Y = y] = 1 for T i where SA i = {x 1 ,…,x k } is the subset of SA-values that occur in T i . We will discuss this disclosure in Appendix 10.3 and show that as far as protecting individual values x i is concerned, small domain randomization provides the same level of protection as table-wise randomization.
THE ALGORITHM
We now present a solution to the Small Domain Randomization problem in Definition 2. This is a clustering problem with a global utility metric subject to a privacy constraint. Such problems are unlikely to have efficient optimal solutions because the number of plausible partitionings is too large for a large T. We propose an efficient solution that heuristically minimizes the global metric.
Given a ( 1 ,  2 )-privacy requirement on T, we want to find a partitioning Part = {T 1 ,…,T k } of T such that (Part) is minimized and  1i <  2 , where  1i , i=1,…,k, is defined by Equation (9) . Minimizing (Part) requires minimizing the error bound  i , thus, minimizing m i and maximizing  i (Equation (12)). From Equation (10),  i is maximized if  1i is minimized (for the fixed  2 ). Therefore, our algorithm must find a partitioning {T 1 ,…,T k } satisfying the following two requirements:
Requirement I: T i contains as few distinct SA-values as possible, in order to minimize m i . This requirement calls for partitioning the records according to the similarity of their SA-values.
Requirement II: the maximum relative frequency of an SA'-value in T i is as small as possible, in order to minimize  1i . Recall SA' defined in Equation (9) is the set of SA-values with a relative frequency ≤  1 in T. This requirement calls for distributing the records for the same SA'-value among T 1 ,…,T k . We use the following terminology to express Requirement II. 
Phase 1: Balancing Phase
This phase partitions T into disjoint initial groups {g 1 ,…,g t }, where each g j contains the fewest possible SA-values and is -balanced wrt SA' and  = |T| / f m , as defined above. The purpose of this phase is to break T into -balanced groups that have a minimum number of distinct SA-values, so that they can later be merged according to the similarity of SA-values (Requirement I). For ease of presentation, we first consider the case of SA' = SA; so we only refer to SA in the discussion below.
The initial groups g j are created iteratively as follows (see Figure  1) . Initially, T 0 = T and T 0 is -balanced wrt SA. In the j th iteration, g j is created by selecting h records for each of the  most frequent SA-values from T 0 . h is defined in Equation (12) and, as shown in Lemma 1, is the maximum number such that the remaining data T 0  g j is -balanced. The purpose of maximizing h is twofold: (1) maximizing the number of records in g i without increasing the number of distinct SA-values (small m i implies small  i ), and (2) minimizing the number of initial groups, which is a key factor in reducing the complexity of subsequent phases. Compute h by Equation (12); 5.
If h = 0 then gj  T0 else gj contains h records in T0 for each of x1,…,x; 6. j++; 7.
T0  T0 -gj; 8. Return all gj;
where (v) = |T 0 | /   max( 1  v,  +1 ). h ≥ 0 because |T 0 |/-µ +1 ≥ 0 (T 0 is -balanced wrt SA). Now we show several important properties of this phase. First, generated groups are -balanced wrt SA; second, after each iteration, the remaining data is -balanced wrt SA for the next iteration and there are indeed h records for each of the  most frequent SA-values in T 0 ; third, h is maximized.
Lemma 1 Let gj be the initial group created by the jth iteration of the balancing phase and let h be computed by Equation (13) . 
Phase 2: Rearranging Phase
Initial groups often are too small to perform random perturbation because small |T i | implies a large error bound  I ; therefore, we have to merge them to minimize the error bound. Requirement I implies that merging groups should have common SA-values. In this phase, we first rearrange the initial groups g 1 ,…,g t into a sequence g 1 ',…,g t ' so that adjacent groups share common SAvalues as much as possible. Later in the next phase we merge adjacent groups to minimize (Part).
We model the rearranging problem as finding the band matrix [7] of a square and symmetric matrix. Informally, the band matrix of a symmetric matrix is a permutation of rows/columns so that the non-zero entries are clustered along the main diagonal as much as possible. First, we represent the initial groups g 1 ,...,g t by the following t  m matrix A:
, where a row corresponds to an initial group g i and a column corresponds to a SA-value x j , and the entry A[i][j] stores the frequency of x j in g i . We apply the band matrix technique to the symmetric matrix B = A × A T , as suggested in [18] . In our context, a band matrix corresponds to a rearrangement of rows (i.e., initial groups) such that adjacent rows share common SA-values as much as possible. We use the Reverse Cuthill-McKee (RCM) algorithm, a variation of the Cuthill-McKee algorithm [7] . A band matrix was recently used in [11] to group sparse set-valued data. Notice that the dimensionality of our matrix, t  m, is much smaller than the data cardinality |T|, as Phase 1 minimizes the number of initial groups t by maximizing the size of initial groups.
Example 3 Let A be the matrix for the initial groups g 1 ,...,g 5 in Example 2. Applying RCM to A × A T gives us the rearranged order g 1 , g 3 , g 2 , g 4 , g 5 . 
Phase 3: Merging Phase
Finally, we merge adjacent initial groups in the sequence g 1 ,…,g t returned by the rearranging phase in order to minimize (Part). .j]) be the  i defined by Equation (12) with T i = g[i.
.j]. The following dynamic programming finds the optimal merging of g 1 ,…,g t that has the minimum error
The first case in Equation (14) selects one boundary point r and the second case selects no boundary point. The final partitioning {T 1 ,…,T k } is determined by all boundary points r 1 < r 2 <…< r k-1 .
Example 4
The optimal merging of the sequence g 1 , g 3, g 2 , g 4, g 5 in Example 3 is {T 1 = g 1  g 3  g 2 , T 2 = g 4  g 5 }, which gives the partitioning in Example 1.
Analysis
The next theorem summarizes some properties of the partitioning {T 1 ,…,T k } produced by the PP algorithm. 
Theorem 4
The time complexity of the PP algorithm is O(t 2 log t + t 2 m + n + mlogm), where n = |T|, m is the domain size of SA, and t is the number of initial groups produced by the balancing phase. (See Appendix 10.6 for proof). Our experiments show that the number of initial groups, t, is quite small on real life datasets (no more than 20). This is because the balancing phase aims to maximize the size of each initial group. Therefore, the PP algorithm is linear in the cardinality of T.
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION

Experimental Setup
We compare our Perturbation Partitioning (PP) algorithm against two competitors. The first is Anatomy (Ana) [23] (code downloaded from the author's website), a partition-based algorithm known to have lower error for count queries than generalization [23] . The second is the optimal Uniform Perturbation (UP) defined by Equation (5) without data partitioning, which is known to maximize retention probability for ensuring ( 1 ,  2 )-privacy [9] . Our code is written in C++ and all experiments were run on a Core(TM) 2 Duo CPU 3.00 GHZ PC with 4GB of RAM. For PP, we use  = 0.05 for the confidence level (1  ) of the error bound defined in Section 4.2.
We use the CENSUS dataset (see Appendix 10.8 for more details) like previous work [23] . Specifically, we use datasets of varied cardinality |T| = 100k-500k: OCC-|T| and EDU-|T| denote datasets having |T| records, with SA = Occupation (m = 50) and SA = Education (m = 14), respectively. Occupation is a balanced dataset, while Education is more skewed. In other real datasets, m can be much larger, which leaves more room for the proposed small domain randomization to increase retention probability.
We consider the utility of answering count queries, a metric used in both partition-based [13] [23] and randomization-based [17] approaches. For this purpose, we generate a query pool of count queries and report the average relative error of query estimates for queries that pass a selectivity s = 0.1%, 0.5%, 1%, where selectivity of a query is defined as the % of records satisfying the query condition. See Appendices 10.9 and 10.10 for more details.
Publishing the Balanced Data
The balanced OCC-|T| datasets have a maximum relative frequency of 7%. For ( 1 ,  2 )-privacy (used by UP and PP), to protect all SA-values, we set  1 = 1/13, so SA' = SA, and we set  2 = 1/6, 1/5, 1/4, 1/3. Ana uses the L-diversity [15] privacy requirement to limit the probability of inferring an SA-value by 1/L. We set L = 6, 5, 4, 3 for Ana, to match the above setting of  2 . Notice 1/L and  2 = 1/L equally bound posterior probability. For this reason, we simply refer to L. Figure 2 shows the comparison of errors for various L (upper part) and |T| (lower part).
We observe that PP incurs less error than Ana and UP. As L decreases for Ana (thus,  2 increases for UP and PP), PP benefits from a weaker privacy requirement, whereas Ana has little change. Also, PP benefits from a larger minimum selectivity s (more random trials available for reconstruction), whereas the same trend is less obvious for Ana. In fact, [10] shows Ana's performance deteriorates for GROUP-BY queries. This study shows that PP is useful for aggregate data analysis.
To get a better understanding of the reason for the smaller errors of PP, Table 2 compares the retention probability of UP and PP, and Table 3 shows statistics for T i produced by PP. The average retention probability for T i in Table 2 is significantly larger than for T. As shown in Table 3 , this is because the domain sizes m i for T i is much smaller than m = 50 for T, whereas  i for T i is very close to  = 2.5 for T. This characteristic is exactly what is required to minimize the error bound  i in Equation (12) . 
Publishing the Skewed Data
The skewed EDU-|T| datasets have a highest relative frequency = 27%, and 9 SA-values have relative frequency < 3.33%. Protecting all SA-values requires  1  27%, but such ( 1 ,  2 )-privacy is too weak to protect the less frequent SA-values since  2 >  1 . It is more meaningful to protect the less frequent SA-values because the adversary has poorer prior knowledge on them. Therefore, we set  1 = 1/30 to ensure the above 9 SA-values are protected by a tighter bound  2 = 1/L, L = 10, 8, 6, 4. In this setting, SA' contains the 9 least-frequent SA-values.
The L-diversity privacy used by Ana requires that T satisfy the eligibility condition [23] : 1/L  highest relative frequency of any SA-value in T. This condition is not satisfied by the above settings of L, therefore, Ana cannot be directly applied. This reveals a drawback of L-diversity and Ana in particular: they cannot be applied on skewed data while providing sufficient protection for less frequent SA-values. To run Ana, we have no choice but to first suppress records with the most-frequent SAvalues until the highest relative frequency in the remaining data is  1/L. The following refers to Ana with this pre-processing step. Figure 4 shows the comparison of errors. In this experiment, PP degenerates into UP because the small domain size m = 14 make it unnecessary to partition T. Ana has a significantly larger error than PP and UP because record suppression leads to a significant under-estimation of query counts. 
Perturbation Time
PP finishes in no more than 30 seconds for all cardinalities tested and is comparable to Ana and UP (see Figure 5 ). Ana is faster on EDU because pre-processing decreases the table size, at a heavy cost of a much larger error for count queries (see Figure 4 ). 
CONCLUSION
Random perturbation has been extensively studied in the literature as an important technique for privacy protection; however, previous methods suffer from a notoriously low retention probability under most practical scenarios, due to "overrandomization" over the entire sensitive attribute domain. To address this problem, we proposed small domain randomization, which randomizes a sensitive value only within a subset of the entire domain. This approach retains more data while providing the same level of privacy. With improved utility, we proposed this approach as an alternative to classical partition-based approaches to privacy preserving data publishing. On CENSUS datasets, we observed a relative increase of over 100% in retention probability, compared to the optimal Uniform Perturbation. The higher retention probability translates into a relative decrease of over 200% in the reconstruction error for answering count queries.
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Disclosure in Our Privacy Model
For reconstruction purposes, SA i and P i will be made available to the researcher. With such information, the adversary can infer Pr[X = x 1 … X = x k | Y = y] = 1 for T i where SA i = {x 1 ,…,x k } is the subset of SA-values that occur in T i ; that is, the original value must be one of x 1 ,…,x k . This kind of disclosure is not specific to our approach; in fact, all partition-based approaches have similar disclosures (e.g., [19] [20] [23] ) in which SA i is the set of sensitive values occurring in an anonymity-group. What is important is that the threat of guessing an individual value x i is still bounded by Pr[X = x i | Y = y] ≤  2 , thanks to the restricted ( 1i ,  2 )-privacy for T i . As far as protecting individual values x i is concerned, small domain randomization provides the same level of protection as table-wise randomization. This is why we consider the restricted form of ( 1 ,  2 )-privacy, where the predicate Q(X) has the form X = x.
We also note that our sub-tables T i are different from anonymity groups in the classical partition-based approaches (e.g., [19] [20] [23]) in two major aspects. First, each T i is much larger than an anonymity group because accurate reconstruction depends on having a large table size |T i | (Equation (12)). Second, the published version T i * is produced by randomizing the SA-value in each record in T i and is robust to corruption attacks [21] . Since each record is randomized independently, even if the adversary succeeds in inferring the SA-value of some record in T i , this information does not help to infer the SA-value of other records in T i . In contrast, the SA-values associated with an anonymity group are not randomized; therefore, corrupting one record will lead to the increased threat of remaining records in the same anonymity group [21] .
Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2 Consider the data T and the perturbed T* produced by applying Uniform Perturbation in Equation (1) on T, with retention probability p. Let f be the frequency of SA-value x in T and f* be the estimated frequency using T*. For an allowable error  and confidence level (1  ), Proof: From Lemma 2, an SA'-value has a relative frequency ≤ /(  ) in an initial group. This remains true for a final group after the merging phase, for the same reason as in the proof of Theorem 3. Therefore,  1i ≤ /(  ), so (i) is proved. (ii) follows from (i) and the assumption on  2 > /(  ). 
Description of CENSUS
The CENSUS dataset has 8 discrete attributes (domain size in brackets): Age (77), Gender (2), Education (14) , Marital (6), Race (9), Work-class (7), Country (70), and Occupation (50). We used two datasets of varied cardinality |T| downloaded from [23] . OCC denotes the dataset with Occupation as SA and all other attributes as non-sensitive attributes. EDU denotes the dataset with Education as SA and the remaining attributes as nonsensitive attributes. OCC-|T| and EDU-|T| denote the samples of OCC and EDU with the size |T|, where |T| ranges over 100K,…,500K. Figure 6 shows that OCC-300K has a more balanced SA distribution, whereas EDU-300K has a much more skewed SA distribution. The choice of these datasets enables us to evaluate the utility for both balanced distribution and skewed distributions. 
Estimating Count Queries
In Section 3.3, we discussed how to estimate the answer for the count query Q in Equation (18) for Uniform Perturbation. Let us explain how to estimate the answer for Perturbation Partitioning and Anatomy.
Perturbation Partitioning Let T 1 *,…,T k * be produced by perturbing each sub-table T i using P i . An estimate est j for each T j *, j=1,…,k, can be computed as discussed in Section 3.3. The sum ∑ j est j is returned as the estimate for the query answer.
Anatomy Assume that the table T contains a set of non-sensitive attributes denoted QI and the sensitive attribute SA. Anatomy partitions T into anatomized groups, or groups for short, and publishes such groups in two tables. Let GID be the new attribute for storing the group identifier. The first table QIT contains Given a query Q in Equation ( See more details in [23] .
